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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from 
which this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(l)(1953, as amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-
2(3)(j)(1995 Supp.) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case 
was poured over to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on March 31,2000. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny the Robertson Family's 
Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Notice of an Appeal when the evidence 
demonstrated that the clerk of the court had misinformed counsel for the Robertson 
Family, resulting in the filing of a Notice of Appeal one day after the time to file such a 
notice had expired, and clearly constituting detrimental reliance and excusable neglect? 
Standard of Review: Because the District Court's ruling was a legal, rather than a 
factual, conclusion, this Court reviews the District Court's decision for correctness. West 
v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997). 
2. Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny the Robertson Family's 
Motion to Reconsider the District Court's denial of the Robertson Family's Motion to for 
1 
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an Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal, pursuant to Rules 59 and 60, when the 
evidence demonstrated that the Robertson Family's one day delay in filing its Notice of 
Appeal was clearly the result of detrimental reliance and excusable neglect on the part of 
its counsel, and there was an insufficiency of evidence to justify the Court's denial of the 
Robertson Family's Motion for an Extension of Time and/or said denial was an error in 
law? Further, was it error for the District Court to deny the Robertson Family's Motion to 
Reconsider, under the lenient standards of Rule 60, when the conduct of counsel for 
Robertson Family clearly constituted excusable neglect, such that the Court's denial of 
the Motion to Reconsider was an abuse of discretion. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's ruling in denying Defendant's Motion 
to Reconsider pursuant to Rules 59 and/or 60 will be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard by this Court. Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125, 
135 (Utah App. 1997); Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465, 
467 (Utah App. 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of an arbitration claim filed by the Robertson Family with 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) seeking damages on the grounds 
that plaintiffs Paine Webber, Inc., Kidder, Peabody & Co., Incorporated and Van F. Dunn 
(the "Plaintiffs") recommended and sold to the Robertson Family inappropriate 
investments. In a desperate attempt to avoid arbitrating the Robertson Family's claim as 
2 
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required by the NASD, the Plaintiffs filed an action in the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs presiding, seeking a temporary and permanent stay of the 
NASD arbitration, on the grounds that the Robertson Family's claim was not filed with 
the NASD within six years of its investment as required by §10304 of the NASD Code of 
Arbitration Procedure. 
The Robertson Family opposed the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary stay, and 
filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint on the grounds that the NASD, and not 
the Utah District Court, should determine the meaning and application of §10304 of the 
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Apparently finding that the NASD was not the 
appropriate body to determine the meaning of its own rules of arbitration procedure, the 
District Court granted the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary stay, and denied the 
Robertson Family's motion to dismiss. 
Before the Robertson Family had an opportunity to perform discovery, the 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on one ground: that the Robertson 
Family's claim is barred because §10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 
provides that claims based upon events occurring more than six years prior to the filing of 
the claim are not eligible for arbitration. The Plaintiffs argued that all events giving rise to 
the Robertson Family's Claim occurred in 1981, "over sixteen years prior to the filing of 
the claim," and thus that §10304 bars the Claim. 
In response to the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Robertson Family 
3 
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disputed the assertion of the Plaintiffs, and argued that all events giving rise to the 
Robertson Family's Claim did not occur until October 1992; thus, the Robertson Family's 
Claim was filed within the six year period of §10304. Moreover, even if the six year 
period of §10304 began to run earlier than October 1992, argued the Robertson Family, 
§10304 is a statute of limitations that is tolled by Utah's "discovery rule." Thus, because 
Mr. Robertson did not become aware that the Robertson Family would lose all of its 
investment until October 1992, the six year time period of §10304 was tolled until that 
date. In addition, the Robertson Family requested that the Court deny or continue the 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and allow the Robertson Family to perform 
discovery as allowed by U.R.C.P. 56(f), and filed an Affidavit of James L. Robertson in 
support of such request. 
The District Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and, 
unknown to the Robertson Family and its attorney, the Court entered its Final Order 
February 8, 1999. 
On or about March 9th, 1999, twenty-nine days after entry of the final order, Brian 
W. Steffensen, legal counsel for the Robertson Family, called Judge Fuch's clerk at the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court had 
entered its Final Order. The Robertson Family's attorney made this inquiry because he 
had not received notice from the District Court as to whether the Final Order had been 
entered, even though the plaintiffs/appellees had filed their proposed form of order with 
4 
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the Court. At that time, the clerk incorrectly informed the Robertson Family's attorney 
that the Court had issued its Final Order on February 10, 1999. Because the District Court 
did not send to the Robertson Family's attorney a copy of the Final Order, he had not 
previously been aware that the Court had issued the Final Order. 
Therefore, based on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, counsel for 
the Robertson Family calculated that the Robertson Family had thirty days from February 
10, 1999, in which to file a Notice of Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and 
orders in this action. In other words, it was counsel's understanding that the Robertson 
Family had until March 12, 1999 in which to file its Notice of Appeal. Therefore, Mr. 
Steffensen executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to his secretary for filing on 
Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that day 
together with the appropriate fee. However, counsel's secretary apparently did not cause 
the Notice of Appeal to be filed with the District Court until the next day, March 11, 
1999, because she did not believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday, 
March 12, 1999. 
Counsel for the Robertson Family instructed his secretary to pay the appropriate 
filing fee, and assumed that when his messenger filed the Notice of Appeal with the 
District Court, that the appropriate filing fee was in fact paid, because the office of the 
Clerk of the District Court accepted the Notice of Appeal and filed the same. However, 
on March 18, 1999, Wendy Purnell, the front office clerk of the Judge Fuchs, telephoned 
5 
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the Robertson Family's attorney, and told him that she could not docket the Robertson 
Family's Notice of Appeal because the requisite filing fee had not been filed. Therefore, 
counsel immediately filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18,1999, and filed it 
with the District Court along with the requisite filing fee. 
The Utah Court of Appeals then transferred the case to the Utah Supreme Court 
for decision, where the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on the Grounds 
that the Robertson Family had not filed their Notice of Appeal within 30 days as required 
by Utah R. App. Proc. 4(a). The Supreme Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Disposition by its Order dated June 1,1999. In its Order, the Supreme Court 
stated that "Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted. Defendant filed its 
appeal one day late, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy 
lies with the district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew its appeal."1 
On June 23,1999, the Robertson Family filed a Motion for An Extension of Time 
in Which to File notice of Appeal. The Robertson Family argued, and provided affidavits 
of counsel, demonstrating that counsel had been misinformed by the clerk of the Court as 
to the date the Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment had been entered, 
thereby causing a calendaring error by counsel for the Robertson Family. The Notice of 
Appeal would have been timely filed had the information from the Clerk of the Court 
been accurate. However, as the information was inaccurate, the Notice was filed one day 
'Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated June 1,1999 (Index No. 195). 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
late. The Robertson Family Trust argued this was clearly excusable neglect on the part of 
its counsel and as such they should be permitted to file the Notice of Appeal. On 
September 9, 1999, the Court denied the Robertson Family's Motion for an Extension of 
Time on the grounds that it was not excusable neglect. 
On September 13, 1999, the Robertson Family timely moved the Court to 
reconsider, pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rules 59 and 60, its ruling denying the Motion for an 
Extension of Time. On December 8, 1999, the Court denied the Robertson Family's 
Motion to Reconsider and entered an order to that effect. 
The present Appeal was then filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 10, 1998, the Robertson Family filed its verified Claim with the 
NASD. The claim is verified by James L. Robertson. The plaintiffs attached to their 
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment a true and correct copy of 
the verified Claim and they stipulated that the facts contained in the verified Claim were 
undisputed.2 
2. During 1981, Mr. Robertson sold some shares of stock that resulted in a profit 
that was unusually large for him. His broker in selling the stock was an acquaintance of 
2Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 5. (Index No. 78) 
7 
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his, Van F. Dunn, who was an account executive at Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.3 
3. Because of his unusually large gain from the sale of stock, in the Spring of 
1981, Mr. Robertson met with Mr. Dunn to discuss whether a tax shelter investment 
would be suitable for him. During this meeting Mr. Robertson told Mr. Dunn that because 
of the recent sale of stock, and because he would be selling more stock in the near future, 
his income during 1981 would be unusually high. Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Dunn if he 
knew of a good tax shelter investment that would not only shelter his income in 1981, but 
that would turn a profit in a fairly short time period, or around five years. Mr. Robertson 
also told Mr. Dunn that he needed the safest possible investment. Moreover, Mr. 
Robertson told Mr. Dunn that he had not been in a 50% tax bracket before 1981, and that 
he didn't expect to be in the 50% tax bracket in the future.4 
4. In response to Mr. Robertson's inquiry about the safest possible investment, 
Mr. Dunn recommended an investment in Lauren Plaza Associates, Ltd. ("Lauren 
Plaza"), an Illinois Limited partnership that was financing a shopping center in Louisiana. 
Mr. Dunn indicated that because Lauren Plaza contemplated selling its investment in the 
shopping center within approximately five years, that an investment in the partnership 
would: 1) shelter income in the short term, and 2) result in a profit within a fairly short 
3Affidavit of James L. Robertson in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement 
("Robertson Affidavit"), 12, (Index No. 127). 
4Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f2 (Index No. 83); Robertson Affidavit, f3, (Index No. 
127). 
8 
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time.5 
5. Because Mr. Robertson did not feel comfortable simply relying on his own 
judgment before making an investment in the Lauren Plaza, he had his accountant, E. 
Dickson Adams, meet with Mr. Dunn to discuss the investment. Mr. Dunn convinced Mr. 
Adams that the Lauren Plaza was not only suitable for Mr. Robertson, but also that Mr. 
Robertson should purchase two units in the Lauren Plaza, rather than just one, for a total 
price of $158,000.00.6 
6. Because of Mr. Dunn's recommendation, and in reliance upon Mr. Dunn's 
recommendation, Mr. Robertson purchased two shares in the Lauren Plaza, for a total 
price of $158,000.00.7 
7. Subsequent to his investment in the Lauren Plaza, Mr. Robertson transferred 
his ownership of the Lauren Plaza shares to the Robertson Family Trust, and he is the 
trustee for the trust.8 
5Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^ |3 (Index No. 84); Robertson Affidavit, <[}4, (Index No. 
127). 
6Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f4 (Index No. 84); Robertson Affidavit, f 5, (Index No. 
127-28); Affidavit of E. Dickson Adams, fflfl-7, (Index No. 123-24). 
7Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f 5, (Index No. 84); Robertson Affidavit, f 6, (Index No. 
123-24). 
8Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, [^6, (Index No. 84-85); Robertson Affidavit, |^7, (Index 
9 
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8. In 1984, Mr. Robertson contacted the general partner in the Lauren Plaza, 
Balcor Management Services, Inc., and asked about the appreciated value of the 
partnership based on the 98% occupancy level supposedly being maintained in the 
shopping center. Balcor did not opine as to the value of the partnership or its shares 
because there was no plan to sell the shopping center; therefore, no appraisal was 
available.9 
9. In 1986, Mr. Robertson was informed by Balcor Management Services, Inc., 
that although the occupancy level in the shopping center was 97% problems had 
developed, and there were no plans to sell the property at that time.10 
10. Nonetheless, in every annual report after 1986, Balcor continued to express 
optimism. In fact, in 1989, Balcor reported rents were being collected on 95% of the 
property. In the November 1990 report, Balcor states, "...net cash flow is ahead of our 
projection for the year."11 
No. 124). 
9Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f7, (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, f8, (Index No. 
128). 
10
 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^ 8 (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, f 9, (Index No. 
128). 
11
 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^ 9 (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, TflO (Index No. 
128). 
10 
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11. In the 1991 annual report, Balcor states, "Our original intention was to hold 
the property for five to ten years from acquisition in 1981, or until such time as a sale or 
refinancing would meet the partnership's objectives. We are now in the twelfth year of 
the holding period, and we anticipate holding the property an additional two to three 
years, assuming a loan modification is negotiated."12 
12. Mr. Robertson reviewed these annual reports and relied upon them as 
indicating that his investment was still safe.'3 
13. However, in a letter to the shareholders dated October 1992, Balcor wrote, 
"A foreclosure sale has been scheduled for October 21, 1992, at which point we expect 
the partnership to relinquish title to this property." Because of the foreclosure on the 
Lauren Plaza, the Robertson Family lost $154,050.00 ($158,000.00 invested less $3,950 
cash distributions).14 Mr. Robertson did not know that his investment in Lauren Plaza 
would be valueless until he was notified of the foreclosure sale by Balcor's October 1992 
letter.15 
12Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, TflO (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, J^l 1 (Index No. 
128-29). 
"Robertson Affidavit, ^9 (Index No. 128). 
'"Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ffl|12,14 (Index No. 85-86); Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3 (Index No. 93-95); Robertson Affidavit, [^12 (Index No. 
129). 
15Robertson Affidavit, f 12 (Index No. 129). 
11 
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14. Mr. Robertson relied on Mr. Dunn's representations that the Lauren Plaza 
was a suitable investment for him, and Mr. Robertson would not have invested in Lauren 
Plaza but for Mr. Dunn's recommendations. In fact, the Lauren Plaza was not a suitable 
investment for Mr. Robertson because, among other things, 1) he was not in the 50% tax 
bracket before or after the calendar year 1981, and 2) the partnership shares were not 
easily transferable, there being no market for the shares.16 
15. Subsequent to Mr. Robertson's acquisition of shares in Lauren Plaza, Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., Incorporated, was acquired by plaintiff Paine Webber, which is the 
successor in interest to Kidder, Peabody. 
16. On March 10, 1998, the Robertson Family Trust ("Robertson Family") 
submitted a Statement of Claim to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
("NASD"), seeking to arbitrate a claim the Robertson Family has against Paine Webber, 
Inc., KidderPeabody & Co., Inc., and one of KidderPeabody's brokers, Van Francis 
Dunn, Jr.17 As noted above, in response to the Robertson Family's Arbitration Claim, the 
Brokers filed an action in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
seeking an order temporarily and permanently staying the NASD arbitration on the 
grounds that the Robertson Family's claim was not arbitrable because it was barred by 
16Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f 13 (Index No. 86); Robertson Affidavit, f 13 (Index No. 
129). 
17Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A (Index No. 83-86) 
12 
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§10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, and that the District Court, and not 
the NASD, should determine whether the Robertson Family's claim is arbitrable.18 
Section 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides: 
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be 
eligible for submission to arbitration under the 
Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the 
occurrence or event giving rise to the act or 
dispute, claim, or controversy. This Rule shall 
not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor 
shall it apply to any case which is directed to 
arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
17. The Robertson Family opposed the Brokers' request for a temporary stay, 
and filed a motion to dismiss the Brokers" Complaint on the grounds that the NASD, and 
not the District Court, should determine the meaning and application of §10304 of the 
NASD Code of Arbitration.19 Apparently finding that the NASD was not the appropriate 
body to determine the meaning of its own rules of arbitration procedure, the District Court 
granted the Brokers' request for a temporary stay, and denied the Robertson Family's 
motion to dismiss.20 
18. The Brokers then filed a motion for summary judgment on one ground: that 
18Plaintiffs' Complaint (Index No. 1-22); Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily 
Staying Arbitration Proceeding (Index No. 23-55). 
19Robertson Opposition to Motion to Stay (Index No. 62-70); Robertson Motion 
Dismiss (Index No. 62-70) 
20Order Temporarily Staying Arbitration Proceeding (Index No. 109; 160-63); 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (Index No. 167-69). 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Robertson Family's claim is barred because §10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration 
Procedure provides that claims based upon events occurring more than six years prior to 
the filing of the Claim are not eligible for arbitration.21 The District Court granted the 
Brokers' motion for summary judgment, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order on February 8, 1999.22 
19. On or about March 9th, 1999, twenty-nine days after entry of the final order, 
Brian W. Steffensen, legal counsel for the Robertson Family, called Judge Fuch's clerk at 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court 
had entered its Final Order.23 At that time, the clerk incorrectly informed the Robertson 
Family's attorney that the Court had issued its Final Order on February 10. 1999.24 Based 
on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, counsel for the Robertson Family 
calculated that the Robertson Family had thirty days from February 10, 1999, in which to 
file a Notice of Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and orders in this action, 
therefore until March 12.25 
20. Mr. Steffensen executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to his secretary for 
21Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Index No. 71-98). 
22District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Index No. 177-
81) 
"Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, f 2 (Index No. 209-11) 
^Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, ^ 2 (Index No. 209-11) 
25Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, f 3 (Index No. 209-11) 
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filing on Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that 
day together with the appropriate fee. However, counsel's secretary apparently did not 
cause the Notice of Appeal to be filed with the District Court until the next day, March 
11, 1999, because she did not believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday, 
March 12, 1999.26 
21. The Utah Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Utah Supreme Court 
for decision, where the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on the Grounds 
that the Robertson Family had not filed their Notice of Appeal within 30 days as required 
by Utah R. App. Proc. 4(a).27 The Supreme Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Disposition by its Order dated June 1, 1999.28 In its Order, the Supreme Court 
stated that "Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted. Defendant filed its 
appeal one day late, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy 
lies with the district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew its appeal."29 
22. On June 23, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting an extension of time 
to file a Notice of Appeal.30 The Court denied said motion on the grounds that filing of 
26Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, f3 (Index No. 210) 
27Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Disposition. 
280rder of the Supreme Court (Index No. 222). 
290rder of the Supreme Court (Index No. 222). 
30Robertson's Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal (Index No. 
197-213). 
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the Notice of Appeal one day late, although ostensibly caused by the Court Clerk's 
providing inaccurate information to counsel for plaintiff, was inexcusable neglect by the 
Robertson's counsel.31 
23. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Rule 59 and 60 Motion for 
"Reconsideration."32 This Motion was denied by the District Court on December 8, 
1999.33 
24. The present appeal was subsequently filed on January 6, 2000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the underlying action, the District Court made the determination that it had 
jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiffs Motion to Stay NASD Arbitration Proceedings, and 
granted said Motion. Further, the District Court entertained Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The primary thrust of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was 
that, pursuant to the provisions of the NASD, the Robertson's claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In doing so the District Court usurped the authority of the NASD to 
interpret their own code provisions. Rather than allow the NASD, which drafted its code 
provisions and had expertise and experience in interpreting them, to determine if the 
31Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal (Index No. 235-37). 
32Robertson's Motion to Reconsider (Index No. 238-244 ). 
330rder Denying Motion to Reconsider (Index No. 264-66 ). 
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claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the District Court interjected its own 
interpretation of the provisions and held that the claims were barred. 
The issue of whether a District Court may unilaterally bar a claimant from 
pursuing legitimate claims under the provisions of the NASD, by determining that the 
claims are barred by a statute of limitations contained within the NASD Code, is a matter 
of first impression in the State of Utah. It is a significant issue in that, if the District 
Court's decision is allowed to stand unchallenged, any NASD claimant may be subject to 
being dragged into litigation in the District Court under the premise that the Court, not the 
NASD, has the authority to interpret and mle on the NASD provisions. Such a holding is 
in direct contravention to the very reason for the NASD, namely to prevent costly 
litigation and provide claimants with a quick and inexpensive means of resolving 
disputes. Additionally, the holding will necessarily create, rather than minimize litigation 
which could and should be handled through the arbitration proceedings required by the 
NASD. 
Counsel for the Robertsons, Brian W. Steffensen, believed that the District Court, 
in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, had made a ruling that was legally 
incorrect. As such, an appeal of the decision was necessary. 
The District Court does not regularly notify counsel when its final orders are 
entered. As such, it is incumbent upon counsel to check with the Court periodically to 
determine if the final order has been entered, such that they are aware of when the 30 day 
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time period in which to file a Notice of Appeal has begun. In the present case, Mr. 
Steffensen contacted the clerk of the Court on what was in reality the 29th day after the 
final order of the Court, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, had been 
entered. However, he was informed by the Clerk of the Court that it was only the 27th day 
after entry of the final order. Mr. Steffensen had the Notice of Appeal filed within 48 
hours of contacting the clerk of the Court. According to the information he had been 
provided, and which he relied upon, his Notice of Appeal was filed one day before the 
expiration of the 30 day period. However, as a result of the misinformation he was 
provided, the Notice was actually filed one day late. 
As the Notice of Appeal was filed one day late, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Appeal as being untimely. Said Motion was granted and the Supreme Court instructed 
counsel for the Robertsons that to perfect the appeal he would need to seek leave from the 
District Court for an extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal. As such, Mr. 
Steffensen filed a Motion seeking an extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal. Said 
Motion was denied by the District Court on the sole grounds that the delay in filing the 
notice was not excusable neglect on the part of counsel for the Robertsons. Such a 
holding is untenable as a matter of law given the facts present in this case. To uphold 
such a ruling is to support the notion that no attorney can rely on information received 
from District Court personnel. 
In essence, this is simply a question of what constitutes excusable neglect. If the 
18 
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Court believes that it is not excusable neglect to rely on information provided by the clerk 
of the Court, which is later determined to be incorrect, in calendaring a filing deadline, 
then this appeal should be denied. However, if the Court believes an attorney is justified 
in relying on information provided by Court's clerk, and if a human mistake is made that 
in the interests of justice it should be rectified, then this appeal should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Judge Peuler's Holding That There Was Not Excusable Neglect Is 
Incorrect 
The issue for this Court to consider is a narrow one: What constitutes excusable 
neglect? The question can actually be further refined in this case: Does an attorney's 
reliance upon information provided to him/her by the District Court, which is later 
discovered to be incorrect, constitute excusable neglect when the attorney relies on the 
incorrect information to his/her detriment, and as a result misses the filing deadline for 
filing a Notice of Appeal by one day? It is this Appellant's contention that the answer to 
the later question must clearly be yes. 
Excusable neglect, in the context of an attorney failing to file documents within 
specified or statutorily defined time periods has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Federal Courts, and the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), stated the following: 
"Both the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have articulated four factors relevant to a 
determination of excusable neglect: 
19 
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"[i] the danger of prejudice to [the non-moving party], [ii] the length 
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the reason 
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the 
movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 340-41. 
The District Court, Judge Peuler, utilized the foregoing factors and held that 
"although it appears that the late filing does not prejudice plaintiff, nor was the length of 
delay substantial, and further while there is no evidence that the movant acted in bad 
faith, it appears to the Court that the reason for delay was not beyond the control of the 
movant."34 Given the District Court's ruling, the issue is further refined to wether, 
because the reason for the delay was not beyond the control of the movant, the delay 
cannot be considered excusable neglect. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.. 570 U.S. 380, is helpful and 
provides a detailed opinion fully analyzing the terminology "excusable neglect." 
In the case of Pioneer Investment Services the Supreme Court specifically held 
that the term "excusable neglect" is not strictly limited to "cases where the failure to act 
[is] due to circumstances beyond the movants control." Id. at 386. Stated differently, and 
in the context of this action, excusable neglect may be present in a case where the "reason 
for delay was not beyond the control of the movant."35 The District Court simply 
misapplied the standard when it held that because the reason for the delay was not beyond 
the control of the movant that there could not be excusable neglect. As noted above, the 
34Minute Entry dated August 30,1999 (Index 232). 
35Minute Entry dated August 30, 1999 (Index 232). 
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U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that such a conclusion is wrong. Neglect may 
take many forms. In Pioneer Investment Services the Supreme Court explained as 
follows: 
The ordinary meaning of "neglect" is "to give little attention or respect" to a 
matter, or, closer to the point for our purposes, "to leave undone or 
unattended to especially through carelessness" [citations omitted]. The 
word therefore encompasses both simple, faultless omissions to act and, 
more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness. Courts properly 
assume, absent sufficient indication to the contrary, that Congress intends 
the words in its enactments to cany "their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning." [Citation omitted.] Hence, by empowering the courts to accept 
late filings "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect," 
Rule 9006(b)(1), Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be 
permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, 
mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the 
party's control." 
Id. at 388. The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of what the term "excusable" 
means and when the neglect of counsel will be considered "excusable." The Supreme 
Court held as follows: "Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for 
determining what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable," we conclude that the 
determination is, at bottom, an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances 
surrounding the party's omission." Id. at 395. In the Pioneer Investment Services case, 
the attorney for respondents had failed to timely file necessary proofs of claim with the 
Bankruptcy Court. The notice of the date for filing had been forwarded to counsel for 
respondents attorney, but in an unusual an inconspicuous notice regarding a creditors 
meeting. In determining that the failure to timely file the proofs of claims was indeed 
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excusable neglect, the Supreme Court stated the following: 
"This is not to say, of course, that respondents' counsel was not 
remiss in failing to apprehend the notice. To be sure, were there any 
evidence of prejudice to petitioner or to judicial administration in this case, 
or any indication at all of bad faith, we could not say that the Bankruptcy 
Court abused its discretion in declining to find the neglect to be 
"excusable." In the absence of such a showing, however, we conclude that 
the unusual form of notice employed in this case requires a finding that the 
neglect of respondents' counsel was, under all circumstances, "excusable." 
Id. at 398-99. In the present case, no one contests the fact that counsel for the Robertsons 
contacted the clerk of the court within the 30 day period after the entry of the final order 
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. Although it was the 29th day, there was still 
ample time for counsel for the Robertsons to file a Notice of Appeal the following day, 
such that it would have been timely. However, as a direct result of being informed by the 
Clerk of the Court that the final order was not entered until 2 days post its actual filing 
date, thereby making counsel believe only 27 days had passed since entry of the final 
order, counsel was lulled into a sense of security that he still had 3 days time to file the 
notice of appeal. This is not even a case like Pioneer Investments where the attorney 
failed to locate the date which had been provided. Rather, this is a case where counsel 
actually contacted the Court to obtain information, and was provided with an inaccurate 
date. As such, if the Supreme Court found that failing to locate an inconspicuous 
deadline was excusable neglect as a matter of law, it follows that abiding by a deadline 
provided by the Court, even though wrong, which counsel for the Robertsons did do in 
filing prior to the 30 days as calculated from the date provided by the Clerk of the Court, 
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must constitute excusable neglect as a matter of law. 
Judge Peuler's ruling that the one day delay in filing was not excusable neglect is 
factually and legally incorrect. 
B. The Unique Circumstances Doctrine Applies And Mandates A Reversal 
Of Judge Peuler's Ruling 
Alternatively, the facts presented in the case at hand allow it to fit squarely within 
the "unique circumstances" doctrine. In the matter of Pinion v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 
928 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1991), the Court succinctly set forth the "unique circumstances" 
doctrine as follows: 
Courts will permit an appellant to maintain an otherwise untimely appeal in unique 
circumstances in which the appellant reasonably and in good faith relied upon judicial 
action that indicated to the appellant that his assertion of his right to appeal would be 
timely, so longs as the judicial action occurred prior to the expiration of the official time 
period such that the appellant could have given timely notice had he not been lulled into 
inactivity. 
Id. at 1528 [16].36 In the present case, all of the elements of the unique circumstances 
doctrine have been met. The final order regarding the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was entered on February 8, 1999. Counsel for the Robertsons contacted the 
Court on March 9, 1999, the 29th day after entry of the Order. As such, he contacted the 
36The 10 Circuit has likewise acknowledged the "unique circumstances" doctrine. 
In Seniuro v Murray, 943 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1991) the Court held: "In carefully limited 
circumstances, relief from an untimely notice of appeal may be available. If the district 
court induced detrimental reliance by an appellant resulting in the filing of an untimely 
notice of appeal, we may allow the appeal in Ihe "best interests of justice" given such 
unique circumstances." Id. at 38. 
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Court prior to whenthe official time period had run for filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
Thereafter, counsel for the Robertsons reasonable, and in good faith relied upon the 
information provided by the Court that the final order was not entered until February 10, 
1999, thereby giving him until March 12 to file the Notice of Appeal. (The Notice was 
actually served on March 11,1999.) As such, the unique circumstance doctrine should 
be applied to permit the Robertsons to file their Notice of Appeal. 
C. Judge Peuler's Denial Of The Rule 59/60 Motion Was An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that: 
"a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that 
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in Law. 
The Robertsons clearly set forth in their Rule 59 Motion the facts and the law 
which would justify the legal conclusion that the filing of the Notice of Appeal, one day 
late, was excusable neglect. The Court held that because the "delay was not beyond the 
control of the movant" that the delay in filing was not "excusable neglect.37 However, as 
outlined above, this is an erroneous standard. Stated differently, there was no legal or 
"Minute entry dated August 30,1999 (Index No. 232-33). 
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factual basis for Judge Peuler's denial of the Rule 59/60 Motion. 
Given that the only reason Judge Peuler provided for denying the Rule 59/60 
Motion, was that the delay was not beyond the control of the movant, and such a standard 
is incorrect, the denial of the Rule 59/60 Motion was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Peuler ruled that because the reason for the delay in filing the Notice of 
Appeal was not beyond the control of movant, there was not "excusable neglect. In 
making this ruling, Judge Peuler applied an incorrect standard as to what constitutes 
"excusable neglect." Mr. Steffensen's reliance on information received directly from the 
Court clearly constitutes excusable neglect. Further, his detrimental reliance on 
information received from the District Court as to the date he needed to file the Notice of 
Appeal puts this case squarely within the "unique circumstances" doctrine. Further, 
Judge Peuler's refusal to modify her ruling pursuant to the Robertson's Rule 59/60 
Motion constituted an abuse of discretion when the great weight of factual and legal 
evidence demonstrated that counsel's conduct did indeed constitute excusable neglect. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse such findings and remand this case to the District 
Court with instructions to permit the Robertson's leave for an extension of time to renew 
their Appeal. 
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DATED this 3rd day of May, 2000 
Mark A. Riekhof 
Counsel for Appellant 
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3 JUDICIAL CODE 78-2-2 
(3) 30 district judges in the Third District; 
(4) 12 district judges in the Fourth District; 
(5) four district judges in the Fifth District; 
(6) two district judges in the Sixth District; 
(7) three district judges in the Seventh District; and 
(8) two district judges in the Eighth District. 1998 
8-1-2.3. Number of juvenile judges and jurisdictions. 
The number of juvenile court judges shall be: 
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District; 
(2) five juvenile judges in the Second Juvenile District; 
(3) eight juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District; 
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District; 
(5) two juvenile judges in the Fifth Juvenile District; 
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District; 
(7)^ two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile Dis-
trict; and 
(8) one juvenile judge in the Eighth Juvenile District 
1999 




78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and func-
tions. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-3. Repealed. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7. Repealed. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice 
and associate chief just ice — Selection and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in January follow-
ing the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justices duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice as consistent with law. 1990 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971,1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees: 
(iv) the Board of Oil. Gas. and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer: or 
tvi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e>; 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
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78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 494 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3Xb). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. is*6 
78-2-3. Repealed. 19S« 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed . 1988 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed . 1986 
78-2-7.5. Serv ice of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repea led . 1986, isss 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity. 
78-2a-l . Creat ion — Seal . 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a s u c c e s s ;« 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jur isdict ion . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue ail ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all 'Ants and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
- i\) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from distort- ^«.,w- : »---
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Art- VIII, § 1 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 688 
Section 
6. [Number of judges of district court and other courts — 
Divisions.) 
7 [Qualifications of justices and judges ] 
8 [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate ap-
proval.] 
9 [Judicial retention elections.] 
10. [Restrictions on justices and judges ] 
U. [Judges of courts not of record 1 
12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer 
— Legal counsel.] 
13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.] 
14. [Compensation of justices and judges ] 
15. [Mandatory retirement.] 
16. [Public prosecutors.] 
17 to 28 [Repealed.] 
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested m a supreme 
court, ui a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
(iistnct court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish The Supreme Court, the district court, 
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by 
Statute 198* <2nd S3.) 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring 
law unconstitutional — Justice unable to par-
ticipate.] 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall 
consist of at least five justices The number of justices may be 
changed by statute but no change shall have the effect of 
removing a justice from office A chief justice shall be selected 
from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided bv 
statute The chief justice mav resign as chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme Court by 
rule mav sit and render foal judgment either en banc or m 
divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional 
under this constitution or the Constitution of the United 
States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of 
the Supreme Court If a justice of the Supreme Court is 
disqualified or otherwise unable to participate tn a cause 
before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief 
Justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining 
justices, shall call an active judge from an appellate court or 
the district court to participate in the cause 1984 (2nd S3.) 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States The Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs 
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause 
1984 (2nd S3.) 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — 
Judges pro tempore — Regulation of practice 
of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used m the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired 
Justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any 
judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in 
Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts 
— Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction m all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute Except for matters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be m all cases an appeal 
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause 1984 (2nd s^.) 
Sec. 6. [Number of judges of district court and other 
courts — Divisions.] 
The number of judges of the district court and of other 
courts of record established by the Legislature shall be pro-
vided by statute No change m the number of judges shall have 
the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term 
of office Geographic divisions for all courts of record except 
the Supreme Court may be provided by statute No change m 
divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from office 
during a judge s term of office 1984 f 2nd &S.) 
Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old. United 
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding s»elec-
tion, and admitted to practice law m Utah Judges of other 
courts of record shall oe at least 25 years old, United States 
citizens Utah residents for three years preceding selection, 
and admitted to practice law in Utah If geographic divisions 
are provided for any court, judges of that court shall reside in 
the geograpnic division for which thev are selected 
1984 <2ndS.S> 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Sen-
ate approval.] 
(1) When a vacancv occurs in a court of record the governor 
shall fill the vacancv by appointment from a hbt of at least 
three nominees certified to the governor by the Judicial 
Nominating Commission having authority over the vacancy 
The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after 
receiving the list of nominees If the governor fails to fill the 
vacancy withm the time prescribed, the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court shall withm 20 days make the appointment 
from the list of nommees 
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the nomi-
nating commissions' composition and procedures No member 
of the Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the 
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating 
Commission 
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision on each 
judicial appointment withm 60 days of the date of appoint-
ment. If necessary, the Senate shall convene itself in extraor-
dinary session for the purpose of considenng judicial appoint-
ments The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a 
majority of all members of the Senate If the Senate fails to 
approve the appointment, the office shall be considered vacant 
and a new nominating process shall commence 
(4) Selection of judges shall be based solely upon consider-
ation of fitness for office without regard to any partisan 
political consideration 1992 
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elections.] 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an 
unopposed retention election at the first general election held 
more than three years after appointment Following initial 
voter approval, each Supreme Court justice every tenth year, 
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Brian \V. Steffensen. P.C. (*?0<>:> 
Steffensen McDonald Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (SOI )4S5-?707 
BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS 
ARBITRATION DEPARTMENT 
JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
and The Robertson Family Trust 
Plaintiff; STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
vs. 
VAN F. DUNN, an Individual; 
and PAINEWEBBER (fka KIDDER, 
PEABODY & COMPANY, INC.) 
Defendants. 
James L. Robertson, by and through his attorney, submits the following Statement of Claim: 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. During 19S1, James L. Robertson sold some shares of stock that resulted in a profit thai was 
unusually large for him. Mr. Robertson's broker in selling the stock was an acquaintance of his, Van 
F. Dunn, who was an account executive at Kidder, Peabody & Co., Incorporated ("Kidder, Peabody'*)-
Mr. Dunn is a resident of Utah who resides at 4463 South Covecrcst Dr., Holladay, UT 84124. 
2. Because of his unusually large gain from the sale of stock, in the Spring of 1981 Mr. Robertson 
met with Mr. Dunn to discuss whether a tax shelter investment would be suitable for him. During this 
meeting Mr. Robertson told Mr. Dunn that because of the recent sale of stock, and that because he 
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would be selline more stock in the near future, his income during 19S1 would be unusually high. Mr. 
Robcnson asked Mr. Dunn if he knew of a cood tax shelter investment that would net only shelter his 
income in 1981, but that would turn a profit in a fairly short time period, or around five years. Mr. 
Robertson also told Mr. Dunn that he needed the safest possible investment. Moreover. Mr. Robertson 
told Mr. Dunn that he had not been in a 50% tax bracket before 19S1. and that he didn't expect to be 
in the 50% tax bracket in the future. 
3. In response to Mr. Robertson's inquiry about the safest possible investment, Mr. Dunn 
recommended an investment in Lauren Plaza Associates. Ltd ("Lauren Plaza"), an Illinois Limited 
partnership that was financing a shopping center in Louisiana. Mr. Dunn indicated that because Lauren 
Plaza contemplated selling its investment in the shopping center within approximately five years, that 
an investment in the partnership would: 1) shelter income in the short term, and 2) result in a profit 
within a fairly short time. 
4. Because he did not feel comfortable simply relying on his own judgment before making this 
investment, Mr. Robertson had his accountant. E. Dickson Adams, meet wiih Mr. Dunn to discuss the 
investment. Mr. Dunn convinced Mr. Adams that the Lauren Plaza was not only suitable for Mr. 
Robertson, but also that Mr. Robertson should purchase two units in the Lauren Plaza, rather than just 
one; for a total price of S 158,000.00. 
5. Therefore, because of Mr. Dunn's recommendation, and in reliance upon Mr. Dunn's 
recommendation, Mr. Robertson purchased two shares in the Lauren Plaza, for a total price of 
S158,000.00. See "Subscription Agreement", a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit *T\ 
6. Subsequent to making his investment in the Lauren Plaza, Mr. Robertson transfered his 
ownership of the Lauren Plaza shares to the Robertson Family Trust Mr. Robertson has authority to 
2 
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bring this claim on behalf of the trust. See Trust Agreement, attached hereto 3S Exhibit '2'\ 
7. In 19S4. Mr. Robertson contacted the general partner in the Lauren Plaza. Balcor Management 
Services. Inc.. and asked about the appreciated value of the partnership based on the 9S% occupancy 
level supposedly being maintained in the shopping center. Balcor did not opine as to the value of the 
partnership or its shares because there was no plan to sell the shopping center; therefore no appraisal 
was available. This concerned Mr. Robertson because he had understood, based on Mr. Dunn's 
representations, that the shopping center would be sold wiihin five years of 19S1, resulting in a 
substantial profit to investors in Lauren Plaza. 
S. In 19S6, Mr. Robertson was informed by Balcor Management Services, Inc., that although the 
occupancy level in the shopping center was 97%, problems had developed, and there were no plans 
to sell the property at that time. 
9. In every annual report after 1986. Blacor reported problems but continued to express optimism. 
In fact in 19S9. Balcor reported rents were being collected on 95% of the property. In the November 
1990 report Balcor states, "...net cash flew is ahead of our projection for the year." 
iO. In the 1991 annual report Balcor states, "Our original intention was to hold the property for 
iive to :en years from acquisition in 1981. or until such time as a sale or refinancing would meet the 
partnerships objectives. We are now in the twelfth year of the holding period, and we anticipate 
holding the property an additional two to three years, assuming a loan modification is negotiated.** 
11. In a letter to the shareholders dated October 1991, Balcor said, "Operating cash flow from 
Lauren Plaza improved during the first nine months of the year and exceeded our budget projections. 
We now expect 1991 cash flow to be a significant improvement over 1990/* 
12. However, in a letter to shareholders dated October 1992, Balcor wrote, "A foreclosure sale has 
3 
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been scheduled for October 21. 1W2. at which point we expect :hc partnership to relinquish title to 
this property." See Exhibit "3" attached hereto. 
13. Mr. Robertson relied on Mr Dunn's representations that the Lauren PIaz3 was a suitable 
in\estment for him. and Mr. Robertson would not ha\e inxested in Lauren Plaza but for Mr. Dunn's 
recommendations. In fact, die Lauren Plaza was not a suitable in\estment for Mr. Robertson because, 
among other tilings 1) he was not in the 50% tax bracket before or after the calendar year 19S1. and 
2) the partnership shares were not easily transferable, there being no market for the shares. 
14. Because of the foreclosure on the Lauren Plaza propeny. Mr. Robertson lost S154.050.00 
(SI58,000.00 invested less S3;950 cash distributions). 
15. Subsequent to Mr. Robertson's acquisition of shares in Lauren Plaza, Kidder, Peabody <£: Co., 
Incorporated, was acquired by respondent PaineWeber, which is the succesor in interest to Kidder, 
Peabod}. Psine^Veber is located at I~0 S. Main St.. Salt Lake Cir\. UT i telephone I-S00-521-SS40). 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
1. MrTRobertson is entidecf toTjudgmraunliis favoTof S154",050."5(Tpius anblriiyFfeesTcostsr 
and puniti\ e damages in an amount determined by the Arbitration Panel to be fair and just under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this /*-' day of March. 199S. 
BRIAN W. S7EFFENSEN, ?.C. 
t^s^/9^ 
By: Brian W.jSteffcn/e 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER INC Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
MOTION FOR STAY 
Case No: 980910104 MI 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 




Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT PAYNE 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRIAN STEFFENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: 11/17/98 Tape Count: 10:00 
HEARING 
The above entitled case comes before the court for Oral Arguments 
on Plaintiff's Motion for Stay. Based upon respective counsel's 
argument, court grants a Temporary Stay. Robert Payne is to prepare 
the Order. 
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Robert W. Payne (5334) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN ORDER TEMPORARILY STAYING 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, ARBITRATION PROCEEDING 
Plaintiffs, Case No. 980910104 
vs. Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily Staying Arbitration Proceeding came on 
regularly before the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, on November 17, 1998, at 9:00 a.m. Robert 
W. Payne, of the law firm of Snell & Wilmer, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Brian W. 
Steffensen, of the law firm of Steffensen, McDonald & Steffensen, appeared on behalf of the 
defendant. The Court having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, having heard 
oral argument in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court having announced from 
the Bench its decision regarding the motion, and good cause appearing therefor, 
TS5 * 0 , , S T ! IICT COURT 
'UKfc COUNTY 
"DeputTcfertT 
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THE COURT FINDS as follows: 
1. Defendant failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the existence of an arbitration 
agreement between these parties. 
2. Jurisdictions are divided over the issue of who, as between courts and arbitrators, 
are the appropriate persons to determine whether an action is time-barred under § 10304 of the 
NASD Code. 
3. In Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 
1996), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that courts should determine the applicability of § 
10304 of the NASD Code. 
4. In light of the delay of over sixteen years between defendant's investment and the 
filing of its arbitration claims, defendant is unlikely to suffer any harm from a temporary stay of 
the arbitration proceeding pending this Court's determination of plaintiff s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Therefore, THE COURT ORDERS as follows: 
1. Based upon the apparent absence of an arbitration agreement between these 
parties, based upon the reasoning in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fermer & Smith Inc., 78 
F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996), and based upon the arguments set forth in plaintiffs' memoranda, 
plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily Staying Arbitration Proceeding is hereby granted. 
2. NASD Arbitration Case Number 98-00981 is hereby stayed pending the Court's 
determination of plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment, which motion was filed with the 
Court on November 12,1998. 
2 
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MADE AND ENTERED this _£_ day of (£}&**' , 1998 
BYTHECO 
DENNIS MAEJCHS 
i V Third JudiciarDistriet 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SKR VTCF. 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of November, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER TEMPORARILY STAYING ARBITRATION PROCEEDING to 
be served by regular mail, via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
\ 
PAYNER\SLC\072413.0t 4 
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IIFIIEB DISTRICT; 
f ^^%Third Jiidiclaf District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY & 
CO• INC., a Delaware corporation 




THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, toy 




CASE NO. 980910104 
Defendant has had an opportunity to conduct discovery and an 
open invitation from plaintiff to request any documents they needed 
and defendant has failed to request documents. The Court therefore 
denies defendant's request to stay the determination of Summary 
Judgment pending further discovery. 
There still being no written agreement for arbitration, the 
Court finds the Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for decision 
and finds that the Court has jurisdiction over the issue of 
arbitration as per the argument of plaintiff and ruling of the 
Court granting the temporary stay of arbitration. 
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PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court finds that if the NASD is interpreted as a statute 
of repose, the six year limitation started running 1981. However, 
even if the Court should consider the NASD rule as a statute of 
limitations and as per the argument of defense that the discovery 
rule should apply, the Court would find that the Robertson Trust 
was put on notice long before 1992 that there were significant 
problems with.the investment. Defendant should have been on notice 
from approximately 1984 forward. The Court finds that with any 
kind of diligent investigation on the part of defendant he would 
have discovered the problems. 
For the foregoing reasons and the additional argument as 
contained in plaintiff's Memorandum, the Court finds that the 
action is time barred and hereby grants plaintiff's Motion. 
Plaintiff is to prepare the Order. -rT"^rr>^ 
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PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MMLING CERTIFICATE 
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this 1 ( 
day of January, 1999: 
Robert W. Payne 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Robert W. Payne (5334) 
SNELL & WTLMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
PILES OJSTSICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
By- Deputy Clerk 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's request for a Rule 
56(f) continuance were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the Court for decision. 
The Court, having reviewed all of the motions, memoranda, affidavits and other evidence 
submitted by the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, finds, concludes and orders as 
follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiffs presented the following material facts in support of their motion for summary 
judgment. Defendants produced no evidence to dispute these facts: 
1. In 1981, plaintiffs assisted James L. Robertson with the purchase of an interest in 
Lauren Plaza Associates, Ltd ("Lauren Plaza") which owned and operated a shopping center. 
2. Plaintiffs and Mr. Robertson did not enter into a written agreement between them 
relating to the Lauren Plaza investment or relating to any other matter. 
3. There was no further interaction between plaintiffs and defendant after 1981. 
4. Defendant claims that James L. Robertson purchased the Lauren Plaza Investment 
based upon plaintiffs' erroneous investment advice and that the advice was erroneous 1) because 
James L. Robertson was not in a 50% tax bracket in or after 1981; 2) because the shares were not 
easily transferrable, there being no market for the shares; 3) because the shopping center was not 
sold within five years resulting in a quick profit; and 4) because Lauren Plaza was not the safest 
possible investment. 
5. In 1984, Balcor, the general partner of Lauren Plaza, told Mr. Robertson that 
there were no plans to sell the shopping center. This information concerned Mr. Robertson 
because he had understood from the investment advise that the shopping center would be sold 
within five years of 1981, resulting in a substantial profit to investors in Lauren Plaza. 
6. In 1986, Balcor told Mr. Robertson that there were no plans to sell the shopping 
center and that problems had developed. 
7. In every Lauren Plaza annual report after 1986, Balcor reported problems. 
2 
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8. In 1991, Balcor informed Mr. Robertson that the partnership planned to hold the 
shopping center for another two to three years if the partnership could negotiate a loan 
modification. 
9. Defendant ignored plaintiffs' invitation to request any documentation that it 
believed would be helpful to oppose plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant has 
not attempted to do any formal or informal discovery in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the eligibility of defendant's claims for 
arbitration under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Cogswell v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474,476 (10th Cir. 1996). 
2. Defendant is not entitled to a Rule 56(f) continuance because it has neglected to 
do any formal or informal discovery to date, has failed to explain why it cannot present sufficient 
evidence to support its opposition, Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), and has failed to "explain how the requested continuance will aid [its] opposition to 
summary judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides a substantive 
limit on claims that may be submitted to arbitration in the nature of a statute of repose. Cogswell 
v, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474,479 (10th Cir. 1996). CL Raithaus 
v. Saah-Scandia of America, Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1989). Thus, defendant's claims 
became ineligible for arbitration in 1987, six years from the date that James Robertson purchased 
his investment in Lauren Plaza. 
3 
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4. Even if Rule 10304 is construed to be a statute of limitations, defendant's claims 
were barred no later than 1990. James Robertson discovered, or would have discovered through 
any kind of diligent investigation, that his investment had serious problems beginning in 1984. 
The limitations period began to run upon first learning of his legal injury in 1984, not upon 
learning of the full extent of his damages in 1992. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99-100 (Utah 
1982). 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
The Court, having carefully considered the arguments for and against the 
summary judgment and the request for a Rule 56(f) continuance, and the Court having 
announced its decisions regarding the motion and request in a minute entry dated January 11, 
1999, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendants request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is denied. 
3. NASD arbitration proceeding. Case No. 98-00981, is permanently stayed. 
4. Defendant is permanently enjoined from seeking to arbitrate any claims against 
plaintiffs that are based upon events and occurrences that took place more than six years prior to 
the date of this order. 
4 
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By. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUNO 3 1999 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Deputy Clerk 
Painewebber, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation, Kidder Peabody & 
Co., a Delaware corporation, 
and Van Francis Dunn, Jr., an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
No. 990261 
v. 
The Robertson Family Trust, by 
and through James L. Robertson, 
trustee, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted. 
Defendant filed its appeal one day late, and this court lacks 
jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy lies with the 
district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew 
its appeal. 
BY THE COURT: 
Date:- // (ttr 
:hard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Tel: (801) 485-3707 
Fax: (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Defendant the Robertson Family Trust 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN W 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN STEFFENSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
Plaintiffs, TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, 
Civil No. 980910104 
Defendant. 
Judge Sandra Peuler (originally assigned to 
Judge Fuchs and reassigned to Judge Peuler) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Brian Steffensen, being first duly sworn and under oath, testifies as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years, I am of sound mind, and I give the testimony in this affidavit 
of my own free will. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar Association, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I am the attorney for defendant/appellant The Robertson Family Trust (the "Robertson 
Family")in the above-captioned case. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in 
this affidavit. 
On or about March 9,1999,1 called JUDGE FUCHS' clerk at the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court had entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order And Judgment Granting Summary Judgment in the above-
entitled action. I made this inquiry because I had not received an Order issued by the District 
Court even though the plaintiffs had filed their proposed form of Order with the Court. At 
that time, the clerk informed me that the Court had issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, Order and Judgment Granting Summary Judgment on February 10, 1999 (the "Final 
Order"). Because the District Court did not send to me a copy of the Final Order, I had not 
previously been aware that the Court had issued the Final Order. 
Therefore, based on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, I calculated that the 
Robertson Family had thirty days from February 10, 1999, in which to file a Notice of 
Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and orders in this action. Thus, it was my 
understanding that the Robertson Family had until March 12,1999 in which to file its Notice 
of Appeal. Therefore, I executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to my secretary for filing on 
Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that day and 
pay the appropriate filing fee. However, my secretary apparently did not file the Notice of 
Appeal with the District Court until the next day, March 11,1999, because she did not 
believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday, March 12,1999. 
I assumed that when my messenger filed the Notice of Appeal with the District Court, that 
2 
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the appropriate filing fee was also paid. This is because I instructed my secretary to pay the 
fee, and because the office of the Clerk of the District Court accepted the Notice of Appeal 
and filed the same. In my experience, whenever we have presented a filing requiring a fee 
without a check, the filing has not been accepted. I usually have received a call right then 
and asked to send down a check. However, on March 18,1999, Wendy Purnell, the front 
office clerk of the Judge Fuchs, telephoned me and told me that she could not docket the 
Robertson Family's Notice of Appeal because the requisite filing fee had not been filed. 
Therefore, I immediately filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18,1999, and filed it 
with the District Court along with the requisite filing fee. 
DATED this 7? day of June, 1999. 








Salt Lake CUy, Utah 84106 
My Commission Expires 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Painewebber, Inc., a Delaware No. 990261 
corporation, Kidder Peabody & 
Co., a Delaware corporation, 
and Van Francis Dunn, Jr., an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
The Robertson Family Trust, by 
and through James L. Robertson, 
trustee, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted. 
Defendant filed its appeal one day late, and this court lacks 
jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy lies with the 
district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew 
its appeal. 
BY THE COURT: 
^r^ t, (Iff ^ C 
Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware : MINUTE ENTRY 
corporation, KIDDER, FEABODY £ 
CO. INC., a Delaware corporation; CASE NO. 980910104 




THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by : 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, : 
Defendant. : 
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
defendants Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of 
Appeal. The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed in this 
matter, now enters the following ruling. 
The defendant's Motion for Extension of Time is denied. 
Defendant's failure to timely file its appeal is not excusable 
neglect. Although it appears that the late filing does not 
prejudice plaintiff, nor was the length of delay substantial, and 
further while there is no evidence that the movant acted in bad 
faith, it appears to the Court that the reason for delay was not 
beyond the control of the movant. As pointed out by plaintiff, 
defendant knew that the Court had granted Summary Judgment on or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
about January 11, 1999. Further, the defendant knew on or about 
January 23 that plaintiff had submitted its proposed Order. 
Defendant's failure to check with the clerk for a period in excess 
of 30 days to see whether an Order had been entered was neglect, 
but is not excusable. Based upon that, the defendants Motion is 
denied. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this ^ day of August, 1999. 
Si^ NDRA N. PEUliBR c 
DISTRICT COURTVffUDGI 
% v * V 
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FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP - 9 1399 
» TtpW 
Q Deputy Cierk 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal came 
regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on August 30,1999. The Court, having 
reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by the parties and having announced its 
decision regarding the motion in a minute entry, and good cause appearing therefor, 
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows: 
A. Defendant knew that the Court had grant Summary Judgment on or about July 11, 
1999. 
Robert W. Payne (5334) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. Defendant knew that plaintiff had submitted a proposed Order on summary 
judgment on or about January 23, 1999. 
C. Despite this knowledge, defendant failed to check with the clerk for a period in 
excess of thirty (30) days to see whether the order had been executed by the Court. 
D. Although the late filing does not appear to have prejudice the plaintiff, the length 
of delay was not substantial, and there is no evidence that defendant acted in bad faith, 
defendant's delay in checking with the Court and timely filing its appeal does not appear to have 
been beyond the control of the defendant. 
E. Defendant's delay for more than thirty (30) days to see whether the Court had 
entered the proposed order was neglect. 
F. Defendant's neglect in failing to timely file its appeal is not excusable. 
Therefore, THE COURT ORDERS as follows: 
Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal is hereby 
denied. 
MADE AND ENTERED this °j day of September, 1999. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of September, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by regular mail, via United States Postal 
Service, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Steff ensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Tel: (801)485-3707 
Fax: (801)485-7140 
Attorney for Defendant the Robertson Family Trust 
FILED 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION RE THEIR 
MOTION FOR 
AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
AND OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
ORDER 
And Request for Hearing 
Civil No. 980910104 
Judge Sandra Peuler (originally assigned to 
Judge Fuchs and reassigned to Judge Peuler) 
In issuing its ruling on Defendants' Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File 
Notice of Appeal, the Court based its denial of said motion on the erroneous assumption of fact 
that Defendants had not inquired as to the execution of the order within the thirty (30) day 
appeal time period - and ruled that this was not "excusable neglect." 
The true facts are, as outlined in the attached affidavit which was filed with the Utah 
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Supreme Court, as follows: 
1. Defendants counsel inquired as to the execution of the order on or about March 9, 1999 — 
the 29th day. 
2. A Clerk of Court told Defendants' counsel that the order had been executed on February 
10, 1999. This was in error, but Defendants' counsel relied upon it. 
3. The Notice of Appeal was drafted and staff instructed to file it on March 10, 1999. 
However, thinking that there was no rush, the Notice of Appeal was not actually filed 
with the Court until the next day, March 11, 1999. 
Since the true facts are that Defendants did inquire as to the date of execution within the thirty 
day time period, but were given inaccurate information which caused them to miss the deadline 
by a single day, Defendants respectfully request that the Court reconsider its denial of the Motion 
for Extension. The actions of Defendants in these regards constituted excusable neglect and 
justice and equity demand that they be allowed to proceed with their appeal. 
These facts, plus the case law cited in Defendants moving papers, support the granting of 
the motion in question. 
Defendants object to the proposed Order being signed until their Motion for 
Reconsideration is resolved. 
Defendants request a hearing on their Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this /j^dav of September, 1999. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this / ^ 
1999, via the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
_ day of_ 5s mt 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Robert W. Payne 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Tel: (801)485-3707 
Fax: (801)485-7140 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant The Robertson Family Trust 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 




BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Civil Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Case No. 990261-SC 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Brian Steffensen, being first duly sworn and under oath, testifies as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years, I am of sound mind, and I give the testimony in this affidavit 
of my own free will. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar Association, 
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and I am the attorney for defendant/appellant The Robertson Family Trust (the "Robertson 
Family")in the above-captioned case. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in 
this affidavit. 
On or about March 9, 1999,1 called JUDGE FUCHS' clerk at the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court had entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order And Judgment Granting Summary Judgment in the above-
entitled action. I made this inquiry because I had not received an Order issued by the 
District Court even though the plaintiffs/appellees had filed their proposed form of Order 
with the Court. At that time, the clerk informed me that the Court had issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment Granting Summary Judgment on February 
10, 1999 (the "Final Order"). Because the District Court did not send to me a copy of the 
Final Order, I had not previously been aware that the Court had issued the Final Order. 
Therefore, based on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, I calculated that the 
Robertson Family had thirty days from February 10, 1999, in which to file a Notice of 
Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and orders in this action. Thus, it was my 
understanding that the Robertson Family had until March 12, 1999 in which to file its 
Notice of Appeal. Therefore, I executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to my secretary for 
filing on Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that 
day and pay the appropriate filing fee. However, my secretary apparently did not file the 
Notice of Appeal with the District Court until the next day, March 11, 1999, because she 
did not believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday, March 12, 1999. 
I assumed that when my messenger filed the Notice of Appeal with the District Court, that 
2 
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the appropriate filing fee was also paid. This is because I instructed my staff to pay the fee, 
and because the office of the Clerk of the District Court accepted the Notice of Appeal and 
filed the same. In my experience, whenever we have presented a filing requiring a fee 
without a check, the filing has not been accepted. I usually have received a call right then 
and asked to send down a check. However, on March 18,1999, Wendy Purnell, the front 
office clerk of the Judge Fuchs, telephoned me and told me that she could not docket the 
Robertson Family's Notice of Appeal because the requisite filing fee had not been filed. 
Therefore, I immediately filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18,1999, and filed 
it with the District Court along with the requisite filing fee. 
DATED this day of September, 1999. 
y^* 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
The Robertson Family Trust 




My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this day of September, 1999, 
via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to: 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Robert W. Payne 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
5 / < ^ 
Brian W. Steffensen 
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FILES 3I87S53GT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Robert W. Payne (5334) 
S N E L L & W I L M E R L L P 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY & CO. 
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration re their Motion for an Extension of Time in 
Which to File Notice of Appeal came regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on 
November , 1999. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by 
the parties, and good cause appearing therefor, 
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows: 
DEC - 81999 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
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A. Defendant did not submit a timely objection to defendants' proposed Order 
Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal as permitted by Rule 
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
B. On September 9, 1999, the Court entered its Order Denying Motion for Extension 
of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal. 
C. On September 13, 1999, plaintiff submitted a Motion for Reconsideration re their 
Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal. 
D. Motions to reconsider are not provided for under the Utah Rules oi ^ivn 
Procedure and have never been recognized as a proper motion in this state. 
E. The arguments set forth in plaintiffs motion to reconsider are not persuasive. 
THEREFORE, the Court declines plaintiffs invitation to reconsider its September 9, 
1999, Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal. 
MADE AND ENTERED this _0_ day of Noyfember, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of November, 1999,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER to 
be served, via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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